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A
mAbstract
We investigate the relationship between early school-leaving and parental education
and paternal income using UK Labour Force Survey data. OLS estimation reveals
modest effects of income, stronger effects of maternal education relative to paternal,
and stronger effects on sons than daughters. Using IV to simultaneously model the
endogeneity of parental education and income, the maternal education effect
disappears, while paternal education remains significant but only for daughters. In
our favourite specification, which proxy for permanent income, paternal income
becomes insignificant. Thus policies alleviating income constraints to alter schooling
decisions may not be as effective as policies which increase permanent income.
JEL codes: I20; J62
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1. Introduction
A considerable literature has focused on the effects of parental background on out-
comes for their children such as cognitive skills, education, health and subsequent in-
come (for a review, see Black and Devereux (2011)). Parents may affect the behavior
and decisions taken by their children through genetic transmission, preferences, or/
and environment – put simply, more educated and richer parents can provide a “better”
environment for their children, which creates an inequity which is the focus of sizable
policy attention (see for example McLachlan et al. (2013)).
The nature of the policy interventions to address this inequity depends critically on
the nature of the intergenerational transmission mechanism, and the extent to which
the relationship is causal. In particular, it has proven difficult to determine whether the
transmission mechanism works through inherited genetic factors or environmental fac-
tors and, to the extent that it is the latter, what is the relative importance of parental
education and income? Moreover, the link between the schooling of parents and their
children could be due to unobserved inherited characteristics rather than a causal ef-
fect of parental education or income per se in household production. This issue is ex-
plored in detail in the review by Björklund and Salvanes (2011).
An example of the importance of maternal education on child’s outcome is provided
in Currie and Moretti (2003), who found a positive relationship between maternal edu-
cation and their child’s birth weight, which is a strong predictor of child health. The
existence of such effects provides an important argument for subsidizing education, es-
pecially in households with low income and/or low educated parents. Indeed thereChevalier et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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for one generation may create spillovers to subsequent generations. The literature is not
entirely consistent but it is generally believed that, while raising the education of mothers
and fathers has broadly similar effects on household income, the external effects on chil-
dren associated with parental education are larger for maternal education than for pater-
nal, because mothers tend to be the main provider of care within the household.
Understanding the mechanisms by which parental education may affect children’s
outcomes is more difficult than establishing that there is an effect. Firstly, parental edu-
cation may be a direct input into the production function that generates the quality of
the endowments that children have in various domains (health, ability etc.). Secondly, it
may also affect the choice of other inputs. Thirdly, it may indirectly facilitate a higher
quantity and/or quality of other inputs through its effect on household income. The
use of policy instruments such as income transfers to attempt to break the cycle of dis-
advantage presumes this latter route is important.
This paper addresses an important issue in the existing literature: the causal effect of
parental education on children, allowing for the separate effects of maternal and pater-
nal education; and for the causal effect of household income, controlling for education.
To date, no study has simultaneously tried to account for the endogeneity of both par-
ental education and parental income. The distinction between education and income is
important since differences in policy approaches hang on their relative effects. Using a
series of British cross-sectional datasets, we begin by confirming the usual finding,
using least squares, that parental education levels and paternal income are positively as-
sociated with good child outcomes: in particular, with later school leaving1. This out-
come measure is important because recent UK governments have targeted a reduction
in the proportion of pupils leaving at 16, and committed to a phased increase in the
minimum age at which youths can leave education and training. We go on to use in-
strumental variable methods to take account of the endogeneity of both parental in-
come and education. We exploit a variety of ideas for identification that have been
used in other research, including changes in the minimum school leaving age for the
parents; month of birth of the parents which captures early school tracking that af-
fected the parental cohorts; and parental union status and its interactions with occupa-
tion that affect paternal income independently from education.
2. Previous literature
It is widely shown that children brought up in less favorable conditions obtain less edu-
cation, despite the large financial returns to schooling (Heckman and Masterov (2005).
Indeed there is a large correlation between the education level of parents and their chil-
dren (Björklund and Salvanes (2011). However the transmission mechanism behind
such intergenerational correlations has never been made clear. Krueger (2004) reviewed
various contributions supporting the view that financial constraints significantly impact
on educational attainment. However, Carneiro and Heckman (2004) suggest that
current parental income does not explain child educational choices, but that family
fixed effects that contribute to permanent income, such as parental education levels,
have a much more positive role. This is the central conclusion of Cameron and Heckman
(1998), using US data, and Chevalier and Lanot (2002), using the UK National Child
Development Study data.
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tal education or of parental income, but not both effects simultaneously. The literature
on estimating the causal effect of parental education on the child’s educational attain-
ment has relied on three identification strategies: instrumental variables, adopted chil-
dren, and twins.
The first identification strategy, and the one most relevant to this paper, uses instrumen-
tal variables methods based on ‘natural’ experiments or policy reforms that change the
educational distribution of the parents without directly affecting children. Black et al.
(2005) exploit Norwegian educational reforms which raised the minimum number of
years of compulsory schooling over a period of time, and at differential rates between re-
gions of the country. Their IV estimates show little evidence of causal effects except for
evidence of maternal education on son’s education. However, Oreopoulos et al. (2006)
using the same approach, but using US Census data from 1960, 1970 and 1980, report
that an increase in parental education by one year decreases the probability of a child re-
peating a schooling year (or grade) by between two and seven percentage points. Investi-
gating some possible mechanisms for this education transmission, Dixon et al. (2013)
confirm the causal effect of paternal education on literacy and numeracy skills from as
early as age four, and estimate that by age sixteen, the children of parents affected by a
British school leaving age reform, gained an additional 0.1 of a standard deviation in test
scores over other children. Lundborg et al. (2011) report a positive effect on cognitive,
non-cognitive skills and health for Swedish children whose parents were affected by a
similar reform. Of course, the minimum school leaving age is likely to affect the bottom of
the schooling distribution more than the top so there is a clear case for thinking, in a het-
erogeneous effects model, that such estimates provide Local Average Treatment Effect es-
timates that are not strictly comparable to OLS. However, to the extent that policymakers
are particularly concerned about early school leavers, such estimates are still of interest.
Alternative strategies to account for the endogeneity of parental education is to
account for genetic effects by comparing adopted and natural children (Sacerdote (2004)
or Plug (2004)), or the children of twins (Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002). The conclu-
sions from these identification strategies tend to support positive effects of paternal edu-
cation and no effect of maternal education in twin studies, and positive effects of both
parents in adoption studies. For example, Bjorklund et al. (2006) uses a register of Swedish
adoptees, which allows controls for both natural and adoptive parents’ education. After
correcting for the potential bias caused by non-randomness in this population, they find
that genetics account for about 50% of the correlation in education between generations
but also that the causal effect of adoptive parents’ education remains highly significant; i.e.
nurture is an important factor.
Holmlund et al. (2011) investigate whether the disparities in results in the literature
are due to differences in the sample used or in the identification strategies. Using Swedish
Population Register data, they implement all three methods, i.e. twins, adoptees and IV.
Their results are consistent with the weight of the existing literature. In twin studies, the
maternal effect is small and about half of the paternal education effect. This conclusion is
reversed when using adoptee samples. When relying on IV to estimate the causal effect of
parental education, the paternal effect is never significant but the maternal effect is quite
large. They also find that there are non-linearities in the effect of education with the effect
of parental education being larger at higher levels of education. Pronzato (2012) notes that
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reconcile the results from different studies.
The literature on the causal effects of parental earnings or incomes on educational
outcomes is not as extensive as the literature on parental education. Blanden and Gregg
(2004) review US and UK evidence on the effects of policy changes which largely focus
on improving short-term family finances (see also Almond and Currie (2010). These in-
clude initiatives such as variation in welfare-to-work reforms which change the extent
of financial support available, or the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiments in the
US, which provided financial support for higher housing costs associated with moving
to more affluent areas2. Confounding factors create sizable challenges in assessing the
impact of income on child educational attainment. For example welfare reforms may
create exogenous income ‘shocks’ but they also are aimed at increasing parental labor
supply, which may also affect child educational attainment.
In the UK, the Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMA’s) provided a sizeable
means tested cash benefit conditional on participation in education (Dearden et al.
2009). Evaluations of the EMA policy trials showed enrollments increased by up to 6%
in families eligible for full subsidies. However, this transfer was conditional on staying
in school and so this reform is not directly informative about the effects of uncondi-
tional variations in income.
Other studies have relied on intertemporal variation in incomes between siblings, but
it is unclear that parents do not take compensatory actions in the face of differential fi-
nancial resources associated with each sibling. If they do, then sibling studies estimate
the effects net of those actions. Other studies look at value added in the form of
changes in outcomes associated with changes in income over time to difference out un-
observed heterogeneity. Similar studies use early measures of outcomes as controls for
unobserved heterogeneity. However, estimation of such lagged dependent variable
models are, in general, inconsistent in the presence of fixed child or family effects. Nor
are they very satisfactory ways of dealing with endogeneity because income may, itself,
respond to lagged outcomes – for example, a failing child may stimulate a parent to
work harder, to provide more financial resources to allow the child to improve.
In the absence of convincing experimental evidence and because of doubts over the
validity of sibling-based studies, instrumental variables have been used to identify the
effect of parental income effects on child outcomes. Shea (2000) uses union status (and
occupation) as an instrument for parental income. The identifying assumption is that
unionized fathers are not more ‘able’ parents than nonunionized fathers with similar
observable skills. Mayer (1997) uses variation in family income caused by state welfare
rules, income sources and income before and after the education period of the child, as
well as changes in income inequality. While strong identification assumptions are used
in both these studies, they both find that changes in parental long-run income have
only modest and sometimes negligible effects on the human capital of the children3.
Finally, Jenkins and Schluter (2002) is notable for being one of the few studies to con-
trol for both income, at various ages, and education. They study the type of school
attended (vocational or academic), using a small German dataset, and find income late
in the educational period is more important than early stage income. However, income
effects are small relative to education effects. However, the analysis assumes exogenous
income and parental education.
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Our analysis is based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) - a quarterly survey of house-
holds in the U.K. In each quarter there are roughly 120,000-160,000 respondents (more
in earlier surveys) from the approximately 50,000-65,000 households surveyed. House-
holds are surveyed for five consecutive quarters. We pool the data from households in
the fifth quarter over the period 1993-20124. Children aged 16 to 18 living at home are
interviewed in the LFS, so parental information can be matched to the child’s record
only when children are living with their parents. Our sub-sample consists of those chil-
dren observed in LFS at ages 16 to 18 inclusive (and therefore have made their decision
with respect to post compulsory education participation) which is approximately
56,000 observations, or 4% of all LFS respondents. This corresponds closely to the
population of 16 to 18 year olds in census data.
The age range we consider is limited because we need to observe respondents while
they are still living at home in order to observe parental background (respondents are
not asked directly about their parents). An examination of British Household Panel
Survey data suggests that only 6% of children aged 16–18 have already left home. How-
ever, this censoring in the LFS data becomes more severe with older teenagers - whilst
98% of 16-year-old children are observed living with both parents, this proportion falls
to 88% for those aged 18 years old5. We therefore drop 2,581 teenagers who do not live
with their parents and a further 12,995 who live with only one of their parents, since
we need to observe both paternal and maternal education.
Due to these age restrictions, the key outcome of interest in this paper is the decision
to participate in post-compulsory schooling, defined as a dummy equal to one if the 16
to 18 year old child is either in post compulsory education at present or was in educa-
tion between 16 and 18 but had left school by the time of interview6. Only 16 year olds
who are surveyed between September and December are included to ensure informa-
tion on their post- compulsory education decision is available. To arrive at our final
sample we also drop observations from Scotland and Northern Ireland. Although these
regions changed their minimum school leaving ages at different times than England
and Wales, they also have quite distinct education systems. This drops another 5,342
observations.
Moreover, for our instruments to be observable in the data we impose the following
additional restrictions: we select teenagers whose father is working and reporting his in-
come; both parents were born after 1933 (and so were not affected by the earlier raising
of the school leaving age from 14 to 15, and whose school leaving is unlikely to have been
directly affected by World War II); both parents were born in the United Kingdom and
are currently resident in England or Wales7. We also drop observations with missing data
on the variables of interest. The details of the original LFS data and the impact of the
selection criteria on the variables of interest can be seen in Table 1. Focusing on children
living with both parents means that our sample is disproportionally composed of children
staying in. While the final set of restrictions severely cut the sample size (16,798
observations left), this does not alter the mean age and educational attainment of those
16–18 year-olds living with both parents. As such, our final sample appears representative
of the population of 16–18 year old living with both parents.
Figures 1 and 2 show the participation rate in post-compulsory schooling in our final
sample broken down by paternal and maternal education. The education of the
Table 1 Sample selection from pooled LFS 1992-2012
All those










% aged 16 23.08 10.34 24.26 23.5 24.01
% aged 17 39.84 29.87 41.12 40.06 39.92
% aged 18 37.09 59.78 34.62 36.44 36.07
% staying on at 16 75.08 50.02 72.37 77.46 78.12
Observations: 56,650 2,581 12,995 41,074 16,798
Note: The following are dropped from the penultimate column to form the final sample in the following sequence:
families residing in heavily oversampled Northern Ireland (1,893 observations), families residing in Scotland (3,449),
families where the parents were not born in England and Wales but who arrived after finishing their schooling (6,372),
very old or very young parents (317), those missing basic demographic information such as date of birth (280), where
father is not working (4,004) or self employed (4,353) or unknown (328), union status of father unknown (1,316) or has
no or missing reported earnings (1,964).
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to a school leaving age of 18. Having parents with more education than this level does
not substantially affect the staying-on probability of children, which is then almost
100%8. The fraction of sons with post compulsory schooling is 30 points higher for
father with a degree (leaving age of 21) compared to those who left school at 15. There
are some sizable gaps between the participation of girls and boys from lower educated
parents. Among this group sons are more than 10 percentage points less likely to par-
ticipate than daughters However, these gender gaps in educational attainment narrow
with parental education. Despite the restriction to construct it, the sample displays the
expected relationship of interest.
Table 2 shows some selected statistics for the sample used in our analysis. The post-
compulsory schooling participation rate is 74% for boys and 83% for girls9. There are
large, statistically significant, differences in the parental education and household in-
come levels between those that remain in school compared to those that leave: almost
one year extra of parental education on average and more than 20% higher paternal
earnings. Additionally, early leavers typically have parents who are two years younger.
Parental income is potentially endogenous either because it is correlated with unob-
servable characteristics which are correlated with the child’s educational attainment, or
because the parental education effect is transmitted through income. Following Shea
(2000), we assume that union membership status creates an exogenous change in in-
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Figure 2 Post compulsory participation by maternal education.
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as likely to have unionized fathers as children who do not stay on in education.
Lewis (1986) and much subsequent work, demonstrates that wages vary substan-
tially with union status, even after controlling for observable skills. This is also the
case in our data. Figure 3 shows the kernel densities of the earnings of union
member fathers and non-union fathers. The raw union/non-union earnings gap for
fathers in our selected sample is 8%. If union wage premia reflect rents rather than
unobserved ability differences it seems plausible to make the (stronger) identifying
assumption, used in this paper; that union status, controlling for occupation, is un-
correlated directly with the parental influence on educational outcomes of the chil-
dren10. In any event, we are assuming, as in Shea (2000), that unionized fathers
(and their spouses) are not more ‘productive’ as parents than non-union fathers
with similar observable skills. This is supported by evidence from the British Co-
hort Study (BCS) where we find little to suggest that parenting behavior differs
across the union status of fathers11.
Parental education is likely to be endogenous. Here we rely on two sources of
exogenous variation. First, we identify the effect of parental education on children’s
education using the exogenous variation in schooling caused by the raising of the
minimum school leaving age (abbreviated as RoSLA: Raising of the School Leaving Age).
Specifically, individuals born before September 1957 could leave school at 15, while those
born after this date had to stay for an extra year of schooling. This policy change creates a
discontinuity in the years of education attained by the parents. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate
this by showing mean years of schooling by birth cohort (in 4 month intervals) around
the reform date. That is, we take a narrow window of birth cohorts around the reform
(+/− four years) to minimize the influence of any long-term trends across birth cohorts.
There is a marked jump for parents born after September 1957 that coincides with
the introduction of the new higher school leaving age. Note that, pre-reform be-
tween 30% and 40% of the parents used in this paper left school at the minimum
age. So the reform did bite, and changed the behavior of a substantial fraction of
individuals in the affected cohorts. Individuals affected by the new school leaving
age had, on average, completed half a year more schooling than those born just be-
fore the reform. Chevalier et al. (2004) showed that the effect of this reform was
almost entirely confined to the probability of leaving at 15 relative to 16 – there
was little effect on educational attainment higher up the years of education



























Sons: N = 8661
Did not stay in FT education (26%) 5.91 15.83 15.86 45.39 43.20 0.43 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.42 17.13
(0.49) 1.09) (0.98) (5.80) (4.92) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.76)
Did stay in FT education (74%) 6.18 16.72 16.79 47.21 45.09 0.41 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.41 17.12
(0.61) (1.49) (1.42) (5.35) (4.72) (0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.76)
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Daughters: N = 8137
Did not stay in FT education (17%) 5.91 15.85 15.94 45.27 43.12 0.46 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.41 17.14
(0.53) (1.06) (1.01) (5.48) (4.70) (0.50) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.75)
Did stay in FT education (83%) 6.20 16.85 16.87 47.18 45.11 0.40 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.42 17.11
(0.61) (1.54) (1.43) (5.28) (4.67) (0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.77)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *
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Figure 3 Distribution of Father’s weekly earnings (in GBP 2005) by union status.
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levels of education. Table 2 shows that the proportion of fathers who were born
before the RoSLA reform is higher than for mothers, reflecting their slightly
greater age. Note also that early school leavers have younger parents who are thus
more likely to have been affected by the minimum school leaving age reform.
A second source of variation in parental schooling, that we exploit, derives from
parental month of birth, as in Crawford et al. (2007). There are several ways in
which month of birth can affect the parents’ education levels: through entry tim-
ing, leaving timing, whole group teaching, developmental differences and through
peer effects. The academic year starts in September but the traditional admissions
policy that reigned in the 1950’s and 1960’s, when most of the parents in our data
were young, allowed entry at the start of the term that the child turned 5 so that
there were three points of entry each year: September, January and April/May.






























Birth Cohort in Four Month Intervals































Birth Cohort in Four Month Intervals
Figure 5 Distribution of maternal school leaving age by third of year of birth.
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children born between September and January, inclusive, could leave school at
Easter, and thus not sit exams (Easter leaving rule) whether others had to stay
until the end of June. In the 1950’s and 60’s whole class teaching was the domin-
ant teaching method and developmental differences associated with month of birth
might imply that the youngest and the oldest might fare worse than the average.
Since students sit examinations at same time, they would be at different develop-
ment ages when facing the same examination, penalizing younger students. Finally,
peer effects might also arise because the youngest might be dominated or intimi-
dated by the oldest.
This developmental effect is particularly important since most of the parents in
these cohorts would have faced a selective schooling system where children were
segregated into academic or vocational schools at the age of 11 based on a single
test conducted on the same day across the whole country - known as the 11+
exam. Based on the results of this test, children were educated either in vocational
or academic tracks. Children in the vocational track were much more likely to
leave school at the minimum compulsory age, while those in the academic track
could go on to higher secondary school and university, see Harmon and Walker
(1995). These two different types of schools placed quite different expectations on
the children and there was very little movement between school types after the age
of 11. Figure 6 shows, by year of birth, the average age at which the parents in
our data left full-time education for those who were September born, the eldest in
their class cohort, compared to those who were July born, the youngest12. The
youngest individuals typically obtained around ¼ of a year less education than their
oldest classmates. Note that the gap closed completely for cohorts born in the
early 1960’s when the 11+ examination was abandoned in most areas of the coun-
try. Thus, the month of birth effect in educational achievement seems to be mostly




















































Figure 6 Average school leaving age by year of birth: England only.
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Our basic model of the impact of parental background on the post-compulsory school-
ing participation of their children is:
PCc ¼ β0 þ β1Sm þ β2Sf þ β3Y f þ X 0hΛþ f DBm;DBf ;DBc
 þ ωc ð1Þ
where the c, m and f subscripts refer to the child, mother’s and father’s characteristics
within a particular household h13. The dependent variable PCc is a dummy variable de-
fining participation in post compulsory education. The effect of parental education
levels, as measured in years of schooling of both the mother and father (Sm, Sf ), is in-
cluded in the model linearly. In Figures 1 and 2 there is clearly a diminishing effect of
parental education, however a linear specification more easily facilitates instrumental
variable estimation in later estimates. Log parental income Yf is measured by father’s
real log gross weekly earnings from employment. DB refers to date of birth (year and
month) so that f(.) controls for cohort trends in paternal, maternal and child education.
With respect to child’s date of birth, we use a set of dummy variables for each year.
With respect to parental date of birth (both year and month for both parents), we con-
vert the date to a continuous number and then enters the model in cubic form for each
parent. Xh contains characteristics common to all three members of the family - year of
survey dummies as well as region of residence at time of survey. Equation 1 is esti-
mated as a linear probability model to subsequently facilitate the use of instrumental
variables14.
In later extensions to our basic model, we additionally condition on paternal occupa-
tion, so that the difference in unionization between occupations does not identify the
IV model. We categorize paternal occupation into blue-collar/manual versus white-
collar/non-manual. We can repeat the entire analysis using seven different occupation
categories – unskilled, semi-skilled, etc. but the results are essentially the same. In
other extensions to our basic model we add paternal union status, so that the identifi-
cation in the IV model only comes from the interaction terms between union status
and occupation. This then captures any differences in parenting behavior that union-
ized fathers may have.
Table 3 summarizes our OLS estimates of the effects of parental income and parental
education levels on the probability of post-compulsory schooling of the child15. Specifica-
tion (1) only controls for parental years of schooling. A year of maternal education is
Table 3 OLS estimates of parental education and income on the probability of
post-compulsory schooling of children
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sons: N = 8661
Maternal school
leaving age
0.029*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Paternal school
leaving age
0.025*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Paternal log earnings 0.118*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.040*** 0.062*** 0.038***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Daughters: N = 8137
Maternal school
leaving age
0.024*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Paternal school
leaving age
0.015*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Paternal log earnings 0.088*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.027*** 0.044*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Control for paternal
union member
no no no no no no yes yes yes
Control for paternal
blue collar occ
no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: LFS 1992–2012. Standard errors in parentheses. Specifications also include year of survey dummies, regional dummies,
dummies of child’s year of birth, cubics in parental dates of birth.
* p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
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for boys and 2.4 percentage points for girls. The impact of paternal education is somewhat
lower especially for daughters. Specification (2) examines the impact of paternal income
but excludes the parental education controls and suggests an income elasticity with respect
to post compulsory schooling participation of 11.8% boys and for 8.8% for girls. Finally spe-
cification (3) includes both education and income controls. The direct effects of maternal
education estimated in Specification (1) are reduced very slightly. The effect of paternal
education is reduced by 20% and the income effects are reduced by 40% compared to (1)
and (2) respectively, highlighting the correlation between paternal education and income.
The second set of estimates (4, 5 and 6) in Table 3 adds the paternal occupation status
(blue collar dummy variable). This is potentially an endogenous variable, but since the
unionization rate differs by occupation, when not controlling for occupation the union
instrument might partially capture occupational income, which would invalidate its use.
Since paternal occupation is correlated both with paternal education and (permanent)
income, the estimates for these parameters are reduced. In specifications (5) and (6) income
is best interpreted as deviation within blue/white collar status. As such, the income effects
are reduced by about 30% for boys and about 50% for girls. Note, however, that when
controlling for occupation, adding paternal income only marginally reduces the effect
of paternal education on the educational attainment of children. Thus indicating that
the correlation between paternal education and income mostly captures the permanent
component of income, rather than income shocks.
The third panel of Table 3 shows the effects of parental education and paternal
earnings when controlling for the effects (not interacted) of paternal union
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fects of parental education are virtually unchanged compared to the estimates pre-
sented in columns (4) to (6); supporting the view that paternal union membership has
no direct effect on the education decision of his children. For girls, the effect of pater-
nal income also remains unchanged compared to specifications (5) and (6) while for
boys it decreases marginally.
To summarize these results: one additional year of maternal education is associated
with an increase in the probability of staying on of around 2–2.5 percentage points for
maternal education (larger effects on boys) and a smaller effect of paternal education
between 1 and 2.5 percentage points, especially for girls. The gap between the effect of
maternal and paternal education increases when measures of, or proxies for, income
are introduced since paternal education is correlated with paternal income. Note also
that the current income effects are greatly reduced when a proxy for permanent in-
come (the father occupation variable) is controlled for. The income effects are in the
same range as those obtained by Dearden et al. (2009) in their evaluation of the Education
Maintenance Allowance. However, the EMA was a (conditional) cash transfer of only £30
per week, so the estimated income elasticities reported here appear quite small. The ef-
fects of parental education are in the higher range of those reported by Oreopoulos et al.
(2006) for drop-out in the US.
To simultaneously control for the potential endogeneity of paternal income and par-
ental schooling, we specify the following system of first stage equations for maternal
education, paternal education and the log of paternal earnings:
Sm ¼ g DBm;DBf ;DBc
 þ X0hΓþ Z0f ;mΛþ ψm ð2Þ
Sf ¼ h DBm;DBf ;DBc
 þ X0hΠþ Z0f;mΗþ χf ð3Þ
Y f ¼ k DBm;DBf ;DBc
 þ X0hΞþ Z0f ;mΘþ ϕf ð4Þ
The functions g(.), h(.), k(.) are polynomials of order three in parental dates of birth
and include a set of dummy variables in child year of birth. X contains the control
variables. As in the OLS estimates, we consider two specifications: controlling for occu-
pation and controlling for occupation and union status. Z contains the instrumental
variables. ψm, χf, ϕf are idiosyncratic errors terms. The instruments are as discussed
above: a dummy variable RoSLA, which takes the value one for parents born after
September 1957, a linear function in month of birth16, which takes the value of one for
September born through to twelve for August born, and either the interaction of paternal
union membership (PUM) and paternal blue collar status (i.e. manual worker) or this
interaction and the direct effect of paternal union status. Given that we control for
smooth trends in parental date of birth, the RoSLA variable acts as a regression discon-
tinuity and picks up the effects of the reform alone.
We estimated a wide variety of first stages and corresponding second stage equations
to examine the sensitivity of the second stage estimates to the set of exclusion restrictions
used to define the instrumental variables. Our IV estimates have the property, which is
also a feature of the OLS estimates, that the addition of income to a model containing
just parental education levels makes little difference to the parental education estimates.
Thus, we refrain from presenting specifications that contain just parental income or just
parental education levels and Table 4 only reports our favorite specification.
















Paternal RoSLA 0.228** −0.011 0.010 0.263** 0.082 −0.024
(0.104) (0.091) (0.024) (0.105) (0.092) (0.024)
Paternal MoB −0.019** 0.007 −0.003 −0.009 −0.004 0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Maternal RoSLA 0.022 0.231*** 0.017 −0.049 0.242*** 0.035
(0.102) (0.089) (0.102) (0.104) (0.091) (0.024)
Maternal MoB 0.005 −0.016** 0.001 0.016* −0.014** 0.006***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Paternal Union Membership (PUM) 0.477*** 0.484*** 0.010 0.462*** 0.509*** −0.001
(0.067) (0.059) (0.016) (0.069) (0.061) (0.016)
PUM*Blue Collar −0.540*** −0.520*** 0.190*** −0.508*** −0.495*** 0.209***
(0.100) (0.087) (0.023) (0.102) (0.089) (0.023)
Using PUM as an IV
F-test of all instruments in each
individual equation
10.51 13.11 23.71 9.7 13.85 25.23
Angrist and Pischke F test 6.24 7.77 35.45 5.75 8.25 37.48
F-test of all instruments in all
equations jointly
15.27 15.78
Using PUM in second stage as
exogenous variables
F-test of all instruments in each
individual equation
8.39 9.42 15.82 7.78 8.74 17.59
Angrist and Pischke F test 7.28 7.44 13.81 6.23 4.34 7.17
F-test of all instruments in all
equations jointly
13.70 12.80
All instruments appear in all first stage equations. All second stage exogenous controls appear in all first stage equations
but estimates for these are omitted from these tables in the interest of brevity.
* p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
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cases where an instrument is having a significant effect in an equation that a priori it
would not be expected to have an effect on. For example, paternal union membership
has a significant effect in the maternal schooling equation. This is probably a byproduct
of correlation between our instruments caused by assortative mating.
The instruments for education have almost identical effects on father’s and mother’s
education. Being affected by the raising of the school leaving age increased the affected
parent’s education by 0.23 of a year, while an August born child, on average, left school
one fifth of a year earlier than a September born child. Note that, instrumenting educa-
tion by only one of the instruments at the time makes little difference to the size and
significance of the estimates (not reported) suggesting that the two instruments identify
the effects of exogenous shocks to parental education through different mechanisms.
So while both instruments identify a population of marginal students, these are not
identical populations.
For paternal earnings we consider two specifications either union membership is in-
cluded as an instrument as well as its interactions with blue collar status or it is
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collar status is always included in the second stage). These two specifications of the
model result in identical first stages. Only the interaction of union membership and oc-
cupation is significant in the earning equation showing that blue-collar workers drive
the union premium. Union membership has no effect on white collars earnings but in-
crease blue-collar earnings by up to 20%.
Weak instruments can result in biased estimates in the second stage equation so it is
important that the instruments’ relevance is tested. Since we have three endogenous
variables there are various ways for testing the weakness of the instruments. We thus
present different F-tests to test the joint significance of the instruments. First, we test
for the joint significance of all the instruments in all the equations separately. For sons,
the F-statistic for the joint significance of all the instruments in the Paternal Schooling
Equation is 10.51. The F-statistic for maternal schooling and paternal earnings are
13.11 and 23.71 respectively. Additionally, we present an F-test of the joint significance
of the instruments in the three equations simultaneously, which for the sons’ equation
is 15.27. These statistics compare reasonably favorably with the Stock and Yogo (2002)
suggested cut-off of around 10. Additionally, we present the modified F-statistic of
Angrist and Pischke (2009) which is suggested for cases of multiple endogenous vari-
ables, and which partials out the effects of the instruments on the other endogenous
variables. These F-tests range from 6.24 to 35.45 for sons. There are no suggested crit-
ical values of this test but using the Stock and Yogo’s rule of thumb would suggest that
the instruments for education are somehow weak. We repeat the exercise for our fa-
vored specification, i.e. treating union membership as a control variable. We reach
similar conclusions regarding the validity of the instruments under this more strict ex-
clusion restriction. These conclusions are similar for the estimates based on daughters.
Table 5 shows the second stage estimates and reports the probability of staying on sep-
arately for sons and daughters, and for the two specifications, i.e. excluding union status
or not. The effect of maternal education is considerably reduced and always imprecisely
estimated. The estimate itself varies widely from specification to specification. The effect
of paternal education on sons is never significant and varies widely, but for daughters the
IV point estimate, at 0.07, is ten times the size of the OLS estimate. The lack of signifi-
cance of parental education is similar to the findings of Black et al. (2005) for Norway.
However, we find a reasonably strong effect of paternal education on daughter’s educa-
tion, as in twin studies, which is much larger than the OLS estimate. The IV estimates
should be interpreted as LATE. The fathers affected by the school reform had large finan-
cial returns to that decision (Harmon and Walker 1995) which may have changed how
they value education. It remains unclear why this affects daughters’ behavior more
than boys.
The effect of paternal earnings varies with the set of instruments used. There is never
a statistically significant effect of paternal earnings on girls and the coefficients vary
widely depending on the specification. The estimated effect of paternal earnings on
sons also varies between specifications. It is large and significant when earnings are in-
strumented by both union status and its interaction with blue collar status. However
when only the interaction of union and occupation is used as instruments and both
union and occupations are controlled for in the second stage (columns 2 of Table 5),
the estimates become very imprecise and unstable. Again, those results are similar to
Table 5 Instrumental variable estimates: LFS 1992-2012
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Population ALL ALL Blue White
Sons:
Maternal school leaving age 0.011 −0.030 0.016 −0.016
(0.037) (0.045) (0.082) (0.044)
Paternal school leaving age 0.028 0.003 −0.051 0.077*
(0.036) (0.040) (0.082) (0.044)
Paternal log earnings 0.157** −0.025 0.192** −0.221
(0.066) (0.126) (0.082) (0.234)
N 8661 8661 3,833 4,828
Daughters:
Maternal school leaving age 0.001 0.021 −0.009 0.017
(0.034) (0.055) (0.060) (0.036)
Paternal school leaving age 0.070** 0.078* 0.015 0.055
(0.035) (0.041) (0.077) (0.038)
Paternal log earnings −0.031 0.039 −0.030 0.059
(0.060) (0.165) (0.074) (0.188)
N 8137 8137 3,630 4,507
Instruments RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA
MoB MoB MoB MoB
PUM PUM PUM
PUM*Blue PUM*Blue
Second stage controls PUM
Blue Blue
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, dummies of
child’s year of birth, cubics in parental dates of birth. RoSLA is a dummy for the Raising of School Leaving Age, MoB
stands for Month of Birth (linear), PUM for Paternal Union Status, and Blue indicates if the father workers in a manual job.
* p < .1. ** p < .05.
Chevalier et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 16 of 222013, 2:8
http://www.izajole.com/content/2/1/8those obtained by Shea (2000) and suggest that (unconditional) cash transfer might not
alter the transmission of education choice from one generation to the next.
We now discuss some robustness checks of our results. In the last two columns of Table 5,
we present estimates for two sub-populations: blue and white collars, since the first stage re-
sults presented in Table 4, suggest that our instrument for parental earnings has power only
for the blue-collar population17. The paternal union status dummy variable, which captures
unionized white-collar fathers, has no effect on paternal earnings whereas the interaction of
paternal union status and paternal blue-collar status has a positive (coefficient of around 0.2
depending on gender of the child) and statistically significant effect. Looking at the second
stages for these sub-groups, we again find no effect of parental characteristics on the out-
comes of daughters. For sons, we see that there are heterogeneous effects of paternal
earnings – there is a significant effect of blue-collar fathers’ earnings on sons but no effect
of white collar fathers’ earnings on sons. This suggests that there is heterogeneity in the
effect of parental income on participation, with poorer sons likely to benefit from financial
transfers. For white-collar fathers, there is a weak effect of paternal education on sons.
We now investigate the validity of our estimates when using the Raising of the School
Leaving Age as an IV for parental school leaving age. There may be concerns that in-
cluding date of birth of parents (converted to a continuous variable) as a cubic
Table 6 Effect of “fake” and actual raising of school leaving Age on parental education
Sons Daughters




















1953 −0.078 −0.162* −0.036 −0.132
(0.100) (0.090) (0.104) (0.093)
1954 0.007 −0.232** −0.100 −0.169*
(0.101) (0.090) (0.104) (0.093)
1955 0.214** −0.046 −0.064 0.031
(0.101) (0.090) (0.104) (0.093)
1956 0.193* 0.090 0.021 0.134
(0.102) (0.090) (0.104) (0.092)
1957 True reform 0.241** 0.247*** 0.276*** 0.258***
(0.104) (0.089) (0.104) (0.091)
Estimates used in this table based on first stage equations that control for year of survey dummies, regional dummies,
dummies of child’s year of birth, cubics in parental dates of birth, paternal union status, paternal blue collar status and
interaction of union status and blue collar worker.
* p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
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September 1957) is not correctly modeling the discontinuity in educational attainment
and only picks up a general upward trend in parental educational attainment. In Table 6,
we show our estimates of the effect of “fake” RoSLA reforms on parental education.
We simulate the effects of miscoding RoSLA to dates prior to its actual introduction.
For example, in the first row of Table 6, we see that when RoSLA is set to have hap-
pened in 1953, there was no significant effect of the RoSLA dummy variable on father’s
education and a negative effect (albeit only significant at the 10% level) on maternal
education. Comparing the effects of the fake reforms with the actual reform (the bot-
tom row of Table 6) we see that the actual reform is picking up the discontinuity in at-
tainment rather than just upward trends because the dummy variables are positive and
highly statistically significant for both fathers and mothers for both the sample of sons
and the sample of daughters, which is never the case in any of the fake reform cases.
Another concern about our results may be that the general lack of significance of the IV
results is driven by a high correlation between the instruments, which would make the
model under-identified. Indeed, the correlations between the parent’s ROSLA status is high
(0.67) but the correlation between parental month of birth is close to zero. To investigate
this issue further, we simplified our model and estimated the effect of paternal income and
maternal education, or paternal income and paternal education, only. Using only one par-
ent at the time also means that the estimate will capture the education effect of the other
parent. Since parents are positively matched, we would expect the estimates obtained
with a single parent to be larger than those obtained when including both parent’s educa-
tion. The point estimates obtained are almost identical to those reported for the full
model but surprisingly are less precisely estimated18. As such it seems unlikely that our
results are driven by the correlation between the instruments.
One final concern is that the various criteria introduced to select our sample, i.e.
living at home with both parents with father’s income being correctly reported,
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results on a sample of two-parent households that included Northern Ireland and
Scotland residents, non-English born parents, or very old/young parents. This produces a
very similar set of results as in Table 3, although the maternal education effect is much
smaller. Running the model on a sample of single mothers raises questions of female
labour supply that are beyond the scope of this paper to correct, but the crude regressions
show that both maternal education and maternal earnings have positive and significant
effects on the child remaining in full-time education19. As such we are confident that our
conclusions are not driven by sample selection.5. Conclusion
This paper has addressed the intergenerational transmission of education and investigated
the extent to which early school leaving (at age 16) may be due to variations in permanent
income and parental education levels. Least squares revealed conventional results - stronger
effects of maternal than paternal education and stronger effects on sons than daughters. We
also found that the education effects remained significant even when household income
was included. Current income remains significant even when some measures of permanent
income are included which indicates that some children could be financially constrained in
their decision to attend post-compulsory education.
When using paternal union status and the interaction of paternal union status and pa-
ternal occupation as instrumental variables, the IV results strengthen the role of paternal
education, but for daughters - one year of paternal education increases the probability of
his daughter staying on by seven percentage points. In contrast, maternal education has
no statistically significant impact on the probability of remaining in education for either
sons or daughters – a result which is robust to the range of instrument sets used. In
treating paternal income as endogenous, the elasticity of income on schooling decisions
increases by a multiple of four for sons, but there is no effect on daughters. The results
with respect to income are more sensitive to the instrument set used, and are less robust
than the results relating to parental education.
The results reinforce the challenges faced by policymakers in shaping policy options to
encourage greater educational participation. Policymakers often view the problem of low
participation as an issue of credit constraints at the minimum school leaving age acting as
a barrier to further participation. For the United Kingdom, evaluations of the pilot imple-
mentation of a means tested conditional cash transfer (Educational Maintenance Allow-
ances (EMAs)) paid to the student show relatively large changes in participation in post-
compulsory education in the ‘treated’ group, particularly for those with the lowest prior
achievement ((Dearden et al. (2009)). This may indicate credit constraint issues, but also
is consistent with a price effect from the lowering of the ‘opportunity cost’ of staying on.
In this latter case, we cannot be sure about the extent to which this extra education is
valuable to these participants. A conditional cash transfer policy may therefore carry siz-
able deadweight potential despite the success of the evaluations of initiatives like EMA.
Indeed, recent UK evidence (Chowdry et al. (2010)) that linked administrative data for a
cohort from age 11 to age 19 finds that poor attainment in secondary school is more im-
portant in explaining lower participation rates (in higher education) amongst students
from disadvantaged backgrounds than income/credit constraints.
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creasing parental education would also have some positive effects, especially for daughters.
More importantly, a focus on increasing participation can have ‘multiplier’ effects through
the intergenerational impact - the recently proposed increase of the de facto school leaving
age in the UK to 18 would also benefit future generations through direct intergenerational
transmission of educational choice, especially through the father.Endnotes
1We also investigate the relative effects of parental education levels and household in-
come on educational achievement at age 16. High school students in England and
Wales usually study up to ten subjects until the age of 16 which are then examined at
the end of compulsory schooling in the school year that they reach 16. These are scored
as A* to G with A* -C being regarded as passing grades. The government’s objective is
that 60% of all 16 year olds pass in at least five subjects. This level of achievement is usu-
ally required to progress into senior high school. Not surprisingly our estimated results
for the effect on junior high school achievement closely parallel the results for early school
leaving and so are not reported here, but are available on request.
2MTO programs are associated with noticeable improvements in child behavior and
test scores, but whether these are caused by the financial gain, changes in the physical
environment, school effects and/or peer-group changes remains unclear. Work on
MTO by Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) suggests that MTO-driven neighbourhood effects
on academic achievement were not significant.
3Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) use similar arguments to Mayer (1997) and exploit
changes in the family income distribution between the 1970’s and 1990’s. They find a
10 percent increase in family income is associated with a 1.4% increase in the probabil-
ity of attending a four-year college. Loken (2010) studies the long-term effect of family
income on children’s educational attainment using the Norwegian oil shock in the
1970s as an instrument. They find no causal relationship.
4Prior to 1993 there was no earnings data in LFS. Between 1993 and 1998, earnings
data is available only for fifth wave respondents; from 1998 the earnings data is col-
lected in the first and in the final wave.
5Re-estimating without the 18 year olds showed no economically or statistically sig-
nificant differences in results.
6We may thus underestimate participation if individuals postpone attending post-
compulsory education until they are over 18. We believe this is a rather rare event.
7Whilst this may create some selection bias it would be difficult to overcome this in
our data. Since parental separation is probably more likely for children with large (but
unobservable) propensities to leave school early, and it is also likely to be negatively
correlated with parental education and income we might expect to underestimate the
effect of income and education on the dependent variables. We also examined the ef-
fects of living with a stepparent but found that while there was a negative stepparent ef-
fect, the interaction between this and education or income proved insignificant. Results
are available on request.
8Note that due to institutional characteristics there are only a few parents with school
leaving age of 17, 19, 20 and above 23.
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boys and 75% of girls (averaged over the years examined in this paper) choosing to stay so
our own staying-on figures from LFS are a little higher. This is likely to be a reflection of
the selections that we have made.
10Support for the view that unionization picks up differences in labor market
productivity is mixed. Murphy and Topel (1990) find that individuals who switch
union status experience wage changes that are small relative to the corresponding
cross-section wage differences, suggesting that union premia are primarily due to
differences in unobserved ability. However Freeman (1994) counters this view, ar-
guing that union switches in panel data are largely spurious so that measurement
error biases the union coefficient towards zero in the panel.
11The British Cohort Study (BCS) data, of all children born in England and
Wales in a particular week in 1970, records, in considerable detail, the attitudes
and behaviours of fathers towards their children. This data suggests rather small
differences in attitudes and behaviours across union status. For example, 23% on
unionised fathers disagreed with the statement that “The needs of children are
more important than one’s own”, compared to 18% of the non-unionised; 60%
(62%) of children with unionised (non-unionised) fathers watched TV less than
2 hours per day on a typical weekend day; 83% (88%) of unionised (non-union-
ised) fathers read stories more than once per week; 57% (52%) of unionised (non-
unionised) fathers always (as opposed to often/sometimes/never) talked to his child even
when busy; 79% (79%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers showed the child physical af-
fection at least once per day and 36% (37%) praised the child at least once per day; 94%
(95%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers has helped young children learn numbers,
etc.; and 79% (80%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers aspired for the child to continue
in full-time education at age 16. The children also reported behaviour that might well re-
flect parenting styles. For example, 56% (54%) of the children of unionised (non-union-
ised) fathers made their own bed and 49% (52%) cleaned their own room.
12We use July rather than August for this comparison since there is likely to be some
ambiguity with August-born children to the extent that schools exercised discretion at
the margin.
13Standard errors are clustered at the household level throughout the analysis. Only
about 13% of the sample are siblings. The analysis is repeated separately for sons and
daughters. Only about 7% of the sample are same-sex siblings and hence used to esti-
mate the same equations.
14The marginal effects from probit estimation are very close to the linear probability
model coefficient estimates and are available on request.
15We control for smooth cohort trends by including a cubic function of parents
months/years of birth. Full results are available on request. Similar estimates based on
probit models are also available.
16Greater flexibility could be sought but at the cost, of course, of potential weakness
in the instruments.
17The corresponding first stage equations, not reported here, were estimated separ-
ately for blue collar and white collar fathers.
18Results available on request.
19Results available on request.
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